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We present a Focused Review on work that was conducted to compare perceived
distributions of men and women in occupations and other social roles with actual real
world distributions. In previous work, we showed that means for the two sources were
similar and the correlation between them was high. However, in the present paper,
although we argue that comparing subjective gender stereotype norms and real world
data about gender ratios is an interesting endeavor, we also discuss the limits to and
difficulties in trying to determine the causal relationship between them. Most crucially,
we argue that our data does not allow us to deduce with certainty that subjective gender
norms are based directly on gender ratios.
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INTRODUCTION
Psychologists, from a number of subdisciplines, have been interested in a wide variety of questions
about stereotyping. Psycholinguists have addressed a particular set of questions (e.g., Gygax et al.,
2008), different in focus from those of social psychologists, about the use of stereotype information
(or rather a particular aspect of stereotype information) to inform the representation of characters
introduced into discourse or text, using terms that are stereotyped for gender. The particular aspect
of stereotyping that psycholinguists are interested in has been people’s knowledge, or rather their
beliefs, about whether certain occupations or roles are typically filled by women or by men. There
are various established ways of investigating people’s beliefs about such matters, mostly by asking
them direct questions about those beliefs. But there remains the question of how accurate those
beliefs are. If they are relatively accurate, then holding them need not reflect some of the more
negative aspects of stereotyping that other psychologists study. Indeed, accurate information about
the actual state of the world should be a better basis than inaccurate information for instigating
change, if it is thought desirable.
In order test the veracity of such “stereotype” beliefs, Garnham et al. (2015) gathered data on
actual female:male ratios for more than 200 occupations and social roles. These occupations and
social roles were taken from a set of 422 terms for which we had collected stereotype norms in an
earlier study (Misersky et al., 2014).
The gender stereotypes we are interested in, sometimes referred to as conceptual gender,
derive from generalized beliefs about occupational or social roles that are more or less likely to
be held by one gender or the other. One set of issues about such beliefs relates to their nature and
construction. For our purposes we focus on one particular aspect of those beliefs—the actual ratio of
females to males fulfilling those roles. There are important issues about, broadly speaking, attitudes
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KEY CONCEPT 1 | Gender stereotypes (of occupations).
Opinions or estimates that derive from generalized beliefs about occupational
or social roles, and whether they are more or less likely to be undertaken by one
gender or the other. Gender stereotypes may contain prejudicial components.
to those beliefs. Do people think that the ratios they believe to
hold are the ones that should hold?We are not directly concerned
with such questions, but one important issue in assessing people’s
attitudes to those beliefs is whether those beliefs are correct. It is
this particular issue that we addressed in Garnham et al. (2015).
Our original interest, as psycholinguists, outlined in earlier
publications (see especially Carreiras et al., 1996; Garnham
et al., 2002, 2012; Oakhill et al., 2005; Gygax et al., 2008,
2009), was to understand the relatively spontaneous use of
stereotype information in a number of cognitive as well as social
mental processes. In particular, we examined the influence of
gender stereotypes when readers, or more broadly language
comprehenders, build a mental representation of a person in a
specific occupation, or social role. For example, in a study on
the spontaneous representation of gender, Gygax et al. (2008)
investigated what gender people would mentally represent when
reading sentences such as:
(a) The musicians were walking through the station.
In their study, they contrasted sentences such as (a), where
it is unlikely that a shared generalized belief would direct
comprehenders into representing a specific gender, with
sentences such as (b), where previously collected stereotype
norms indicate that comprehenders should be more likely to
mentally represent, or imagine, women.
(b) The nurses were walking through the station.
In English, at least (experiments were also conducted in French
and German), the authors showed that readers’ representation
of gender was heavily based on the role noun’s stereotypicality.
Concretely, readers showed some difficulty in processing
continuation sentences such as (c) when it followed (b), but
not (a).
(c) Since sunny weather was forecast several of the men weren’t
wearing a coat.
More generally, research on this topic (using a wide range
of methods, from judgment tasks to EEG) have shown that
in English, where there is no grammatical gender information
on most nouns, (1) readers base their mental representations
of gender on stereotypes (e.g., Oakhill et al., 2005), (2) the
mechanisms leading them to do so are difficult to overcome,
though (3) certain specific types of training may lead readers
to distant themselves from habitual stereotypes (Finnegan et al.,
2015a,b). In other languages, stereotype information interacts
with grammatical gender to produce more complex, but readily
explicable, patterns of behavior.
From a psycholinguistic point of view, the results of these
studies are straightforward. Generalized beliefs about female and
male occupancy of various roles, as measured in norming studies,
determine, in conjunction with grammatical gender information,
in languages in which it is present, whether characters mentioned
using role names are taken to be female or male. From a broader
perspective, however, various questions remain, and in particular
the nature of the stereotypical belief measured in norming
studies. Given that inferences about gender, when encountering
an occupational or social role, are primarily driven by people’s
beliefs about gender representation in that roles, the question
arises as to what exactly constitutes those beliefs. On the one
hand, these beliefs might be derived directly from observation
of probabilities, in which case they might provide a reasonably
accurate representation of reality. On the other hand, they might
be influenced by shared social norms, learned, for example,
through social media, television or school, by prejudice, or by
other factors not closely linked to actual occupancy of the roles.
In this case beliefs about gender may be associated with the kind
of biases associated with the negative aspects of stereotyping, and
that inevitably direct comprehenders’ representations toward a
particular gender.
Before pursuing this complex question, it is important to
understand how stereotype norms are usually measured in
studies such as Misersky et al. (2014), and in what way these
norming studies are typically carried out as a prelude to





The psycholinguistic research on stereotyping in which we have
been engaged, going back to Carreiras et al. (1996), wasmotivated
not by questions about stereotyping per-se, but by questions
about inference in text comprehension. The importance of
inference in text comprehension was first emphasized by
Bransford’s (e.g., Bransford et al., 1972) characterization of
comprehension as an integrative and a constructive process. By
integrative, Bransford meant that information in different parts
of a text needed to be put together in often quite complex ways.
By constructive he meant that information explicit in a text
had to be combined with other information, often background
knowledge, to get a full interpretation of the text. Integration
and construction often go hand in hand, and both can require
inferences to be made.
Bransford’s own writings suggested that many inferences were
made as texts are read, but much of his evidence came from
what happened after reading was complete (e.g., in answering
questions about the text), and was later dismissed as not
providing direct evidence for what happens during reading.
Many people pointed out that there was no limit to the number
of inferences that might be made from any particular text, and
various ideas were propounded for how those inference might
be limited. One suggestion of a set of inferences that might be
made was for those based, or based primarily, on the presence of
a single word in the text. Initially, it was proposed that the key set
of inferences were those based on the coremeaning of a word. For
example, dressmeans to put clothes on, and Garrod and Sanford
(1981) were able to show that clothes were as much a part of the
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representation of “Mary dressed the baby” as of “Mary put the
clothes on the baby.” Our early work on stereotypes showed a
similar finding for words such as “nurse” and “engineer,” where
an inference to the probable gender of a person described as
“the nurse” or “the engineer” seemed to be made immediately.
In relation to theories of inference, the interesting aspect of this
result is that, for example, being female is in fact not part of the
core definition of nurse.
To carry out these studies we needed normative information
about stereotyping of occupations and social roles in the
population we were studying. Because we were not directly
interested in the prejudicial aspects of stereotyping, we asked
people directly about their beliefs about the relative numbers
of females and males in the kinds of roles we wanted to study.
Prima facie, therefore, we might have expected to tap relatively
accurate beliefs about these ratios, provided that people had
some reasonably accurate way of estimating them. We have used
similar methods in later studies, including our most recent, large
scale study reported in Misersky et al. (2014). For these norms,
we assembled an extensive list of English role nouns (N = 422)
and translated as many as possible into six other languages
(Czech, French, German, Italian, Norwegian, and Slovak), which
were represented in the research network of which we were part
(Marie Curie ITN, Language, Cognition, and Gender, ref no...).
These norms were intended for use in the selection of stimulus
materials for studies on gender representations. To collect the
norms, we used an on-line questionnaire, in which participants
were presented with the role nouns, each accompanied by an
11-point scale (0% women/100% men to 100%women/0%men1).
Participants, in all languages were instructed as follows:
“Your task is to estimate to what extent the groups are made up
of women or men. For instance, if you associate the group “actors”
exclusively with women, click the button that corresponds to “100%
women” (“actresses”). If you think that the group is formed of men
only, click the button that corresponds to “100% men” (“actors”). If
you think that the group is formed of an equal percentage of men
and women, click the button on the middle (50/50). Use the other
circles to represent other percentages as appropriate. There are no
right or wrong answers. We are interested in what you think is the
real proportion of men and women in the social groups and not in
your view of gender equality. Please answer as quickly as possible,
without thinking too much about the meaning of each group.”
These instructions demonstrate that we specifically asked people
to make a judgment about how they believe things are in the
world, not how they should be. Furthermore, they do not ask
about people’s personal views about gender equality, only about
their beliefs about the proportion of men and women in the
different occupations.
EXAMINING TRUE GENDER RATIO
Of course, it does not follow that if you ask people to report their
beliefs about how the world is, either that they will comply with
the instruction, or, even if they do, that their reported beliefs
1The order of presentation of the stimuli was random for each participant,
and the order of the scale (i.e., women on the left, women on the right) was
counterbalanced.
will be accurate. In some ways, these issues are unimportant
in a narrow interpretation of psycholinguistic results. People’s
beliefs drive their interpretation of texts, and it does not matter,
in this narrow sense, whether those beliefs are correct. However,
the question of whether people’s beliefs about the occupancy
of social roles are correct does have implications for whether
their “stereotypes” might, for instance, be benign or pernicious.
Beliefs that accurately reflect the state of the world are not
necessarily benign. Nevertheless, the accuracy, or otherwise, of
people’s beliefs may have implications for how we interpret those
beliefs.
In Garnham et al. (2015), we wanted to compare the norms,
or beliefs, reported in Misersky et al. (2014) to actual true gender
ratios. In the first instance we focused on the norms for English
and true gender ratios in the UK. There are many reasons why
such a comparison might be of interest. One reason, which we
mentioned in the paper, would be to determine whether there
was evidence that stereotyping is based on outdated true gender
ratios (Wilbourn and Kee, 2010), with, for example, more males
being reported as occupying traditionally male occupations than
is currently the case, or on (possibly incorrect) assumptions about
current female/male ratios (Lopez-Zafra and Garcia-Retamero,
2012; Mills et al., 2012), which might, for example, make the
estimates generally inaccurate. Because of the way we approached
the problem, our research was constrained by the list of 422
English role names in the Misersky et al. list. Largely for this
reason, it proved difficult to obtain some of the true gender ratios
wewere seeking. The categories used in our principal source, data
from the UK Office for National Statistics, did not always map
easily onto the terms used in the Misersky et al. study. Other
issues with this data source and with other data sources, such
as Scopus and Google Scholar, are detailed in Garnham et al.
(2015). In the end, we obtained gender ratios for 290 of the
422 terms, but 85 of these were clearly problematic, for reasons
that are, again, detailed in the original paper. Nevertheless, we
had estimates of gender ratios, based on a satisfactory mapping
between Misersky et al.’s terms and those for which we had
real world data, for a little less than half of the occupations
normed in Misersky et al., which amounted to 205 terms in
total. For these 205 role names, the correlation between the
true ratio and the ratio from the norms was 0.849. For the
85 excluded items, the correlation was much lower at 0.273.
KEY CONCEPT 2 | True gender ratios.
The ratio of men to women (or vice versa) in social roles or occupations. Such
ratios should be derived from reliable statistical data, and will depend on context
(e.g., surgeons in the UK).
KEY CONCEPT 3 | Correlation.
A symmetrical relationship between two or more variables that change together.
A correlation may be positive, when the two variables increase or decrease
together, or negative, when they change in different directions. Correlation is
not evidence for a causal relationship, though causes and effects do co-vary.
The high positive correlation simply means that the two sets
of scores increase together quite closely. However, it does not
mean that the judgments are accurate. In regression terms, either
the slope or the intercept could be inaccurate. For the 205 roles
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names for which we had reliable data, the Misersky et al. ratios
were on average 0.02 greater than the true ratios, indicating a
close match. However the slope of the regression of the Misersky
ratios on the true ratios was 0.48, indicating—taking into account
the accurate mean—a tendency for judgments to be less extreme
than the true values. More specifically, the regression equation
was:
Misersky ratio = 0.242 + 0.479 × True Ratio
So, at the mid-point, where the true ratio is 0.5, the predicted
Misersky ratio is 0.481, and both high and low ratios are predicted
to be less extreme than the actual values.
In Garnham et al. (2015) we pointed out a problem with
reported true ratios of 1 or 0. Such ratios were (apparently)
reported in ONS statistics when the number of women or men in
an occupation was numerically small. Depending on how many
women or men were in larger category, the effect of treating
the smaller category as being 0 could have a larger or a smaller
effect. In the most extreme case, the actual ratio of female to male
shoemakers could have been anywhere between 0 and 0.43 (see
original paper for details). If we remove these items, the slope for
the remaining 154 items increases somewhat and the equation
becomes:
Misersky ratio = 0.214 + 0.564 × True Ratio
The predicted judgment for a true ratio of 0.5 is 0.496, which is
even close to the real ratio, and there is slightly less attenuation in
the prediction of the more extreme scores.
These observations raise two questions. The first is how the
correlation between judged ratios and true ratios comes about.
The second is how the details of relationship observed relate to
a broader notion of stereotyping. We believe that the answers to
these questions are entwined in a complicated way.
IS THERE A CAUSAL RELATION BETWEEN
STEREOTYPE NORMS AND TRUE
GENDER RATIOS?
It is a truism that a correlation is not necessarily an indication of
a causal relationship. For one thing, correlation is a symmetrical
relationship, whereas causation is not. For another, two effects
can be correlated because they are both caused by the same
factors, in a simple or a complex way. Nevertheless, it is notable
that, in our data, there appears to be no systematic bias in
estimating gender ratios. The average difference between true
ratios and estimated ratios is close to zero. However, the fact that
the regression slope is closer to a half than to one suggests that
the absolute deviations between the two scores increases as the
proportions of females andmales becomemore extreme, whether
in favor of females or in favor of males. If anything, the judged
ratios are not as extreme (or “stereotyped”) as the real ratios. So,
KEY CONCEPT 4 | Causal relationship.
An asymmetrical relationship in which one type of event, state or process (the
cause) brings about the other (the effect).
although estimated gender ratios could be relatively
straightforwardly derived from knowledge of true ratios,
however obtained, there must at least be some other influence
to account for the attenuation in the extreme values in the
estimates. This influence could in part derive from the method
of obtaining judgments. For example, it is plausible that people
would be reluctant to say a role is 100% female or 100% male.
But deciding against this response requires, given the way our
questionnaire is constructed, selection of a 10% male or 10%
female response, which would not be an accurate reflection of
a role in which, for example, 98% of the occupants were male.
However, the predicted judged value for a role with 100% men is
89% men, so the method of measurement cannot explain all of
the attenuation at extreme values.
One consequence of the nature of the relation between true
gender ratios and judged gender ratios, and in particular the
apparent lack of bias in the set of judgments as a whole, is that
one might be tempted to say that the judgments collected by
Misersky et al. do not truly constitute stereotypes, or at least that
they not reflect stereotyping by the personmaking the judgments.
Tomake this point is not to say that people are not disadvantaged
by being (partially) excluded from certain roles, only that people’s
judgments of the number of people in those roles do not reflect
any additional bias, other than the biases that determine whether
women or men fill the roles.
It is worth emphasizing that the fact that stereotype norms
deviate from real world ratios only rules out a very direct link
between the two. The more important conclusion from our
findings is that there appears to be a common foundation for
real world gender ratios and our beliefs about them. Indeed, given
the fact that most people do not have access to reliable statistical
information, or at least that they do not typically spend time
poring through data from the Office of National Statistics, or
similar sites in other countries, people seem remarkably well-
tuned to the relative female:male ratios in a wide ranges of
occupations and social roles.
However, it is also true that our data cannot rule out the
possibility that people’s judgments are determined by prejudicial
processes, which might in turn shape reality. An extreme version
of this idea would be that people’s judgments reflect directly
how they think things should be, and that the prejudices
reflected in such judgments also determine whether people
take on certain occupations and roles. This extreme version is
somewhat unlikely, given that it would require people in the
norming studies to explicitly go against the instructions they
are given to make judgments based on how things are rather
than how they ought to be. Nevertheless, if judgments in the
Misersky et al. task and real gender ratios are both the result
of a complex set of processes, broadly prejudicial effects could
be at least partially responsible for the pattern of results we
obtained. For example, through shared beliefs, reflected in, or
even manipulated by, the media, through education, or through
parenting, people may be more inclined to choose particular
occupations. At the same time, they may also believe that these
occupations are particularly fitted for a specific gender, and their
judgments of who takes up such occupations may be influenced
by these factors. Such processes may be pernicious, particular
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if they have their effects early in people’s lives. For example, in
many cultures, women are attributed less mathematical skills
than men (e.g., Spelke, 2005). Interestingly, it has been reported
that gender differences in performance in mathematics are
non-existent in childhood (or very small; Hyde, 2005). Thus,
there is a common discriminatory belief that may have two
consequences. First, the belief becomes lodged in people’s minds,
and may affect, either positively or negatively, their feelings
about their own mathematical ability. Second, girls and women
may be reluctant to choose careers associated with mathematics.
Both the judgments about mathematicians in Misersky et al.
(2014), and the real world ratio reported in Garnham et al.
(2015), may reflect these societal attitudes to women and
mathematics.
This kind of indirect link explanation for our findings does
not fit well with the idea that the norms collected should not be
thought of as stereotypes because they reflect reality. It remains
true that the judgments do not reflect any additional bias above
what is seen in the distribution of females and males in various
roles. Nevertheless, on this view, the beliefs that underlie the
judgments are part of what produces this prejudicial distribution,
and in this sense they stereotype people, in the negative sense
of stereotyping. However, on neither view does the fact that our
real world data tells us that there are more male mathematicians
than female mathematicians mean that mathematics is a domain
particularly fitted, biologically or otherwise, for boys.
As should be clear from our discussion above, neither the
data from the norming studies nor the real world ratios reported
by Garnham et al. allow us to distinguish among the possible
causal links between norming and real world data. However,
the studies raise some interesting questions about our mental
representations of gender, and provide some constraints on what
the answers to those questions must be.
NORMS AND/OR REAL WORLD DATA AS
BIASES
One issue that we have not considered so far is that, although
our data show that people are sensitive to the ratio of females to
males who filled particular roles, when they read about a surgeon
or some surgeons, they appear to use “stereotype” information to
infer that the surgeon or surgeons are male, regardless of whether
the proportion of male surgeons (or whatever) is rather high or
very high.
As wementioned in the Introduction, adult readers have some
difficulty with sentences such as “The surgeons were walking
through the station. Since sunny weather was forecast several of
the women weren’t wearing a coat.” (Gygax et al., 2008). This
difficulty is interpreted as showing that when encountering the
role noun surgeon, readers form a male mental representation.
Reading of later parts of the text can be impaired by this specific
representation, if, as in the example, some or all of the surgeons
turn out to be female. In some cases more extreme effects are
seen, and readers cannot form a coherent representation of the
information in a text, simply because they do not consider the
possibility that a surgeon is a woman. For example, Reynolds et al.
(2006) found that many people could not resolve the following
well-known riddle:
This morning a father and his son were driving along the
motorway to work, when they were involved in a horrible accident.
The father was killed and the son was quickly driven to hospital
severely injured. When the boy was taken into the hospital a
passing surgeon exclaimed: “Oh my God, that is my son!”
If people used probabilistic information based on the fact that
most, but not all, surgeons are male, they should have been able
to see that the surgeon could be a woman. In this case, they
may have been slightly delayed in solving the riddle, as Gygax
et al.’s participants were slowed down in figuring out that there
were women in the group of surgeons. However, they often
tried to reject the more explicitly stated, and less contravertable,
information that the surgeon was the parent of the boy, rather
than the probabilistic information that a surgeon is more likely
to be male than female. Even if people have reasonably accurate
information about females and males who occupy certain roles,
they can display biases in using that information that lead them
to incorrect conclusions.
A more complex illustration of bias is seen in a study by
Vervecken et al. (2015) on an adolescent population. In their
study, Vervecken et al. presented 15 occupations2 to adolescents
aged 12–17, and asked them to indicate on a five-point Likert
scale who they thought would succeed in each occupation (1
= only men, 3 = men and women alike, 5 = only women).
Thus, the authors did not simply ask what they thought the
proportions of men and women were, but who they thought
would succeed in these jobs. Their results were in line with
Misersky et al.’s data, demonstrating that beliefs about the
proportion of men and women in different occupations is
associated with beliefs about the success of women and men in
those occupations. In other words, whether their representations
of gender were based on shared beliefs or on true gender
ratios, these adolescents associated the ratio of female to male
in professions with success in those professions. As far as
we know, there is no evidence for such a link, but whether
there is, is an empirical question, given a precise enough
definition of success. Of course, an exhaustive approach to
this question should address these effects as potentially age-
dependent.
CONCLUSIONS
Comparing subjective gender stereotype norms and real world
data about gender ratios in occupations and social roles is
an interesting endeavor, and raises some stimulating issues,
KEY CONCEPT 5 | (Gender) stereotype norms.
Information gathered by directly asking people for their beliefs about the relative
numbers of females and males in certain roles or occupations. In our research
we specifically ask people to base their responses on beliefs about how the
world is, not how they think it should be, but norms can be collected in other
ways.
2The experimental manipulation of Vervecken et al. goes beyond the scope of this
paper, as it concerned mainly French.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 July 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1036
Gygax et al. True Gender Ratios and Stereotype Norms
especially for those interested in the way beliefs about
certain occupations constrain our representations of gender.
However, it is also important to understand that the causal
relationship between the two may take a variety of forms,
and our analysis can only impose a limited number of
constraints on what that relationship might be. Importantly,
it cannot be said with certainty that subjective gender norms
are straightforwardly based on true gender ratios, inasmuch
as both may derive from a system of beliefs and their
effect on behavior, rather than one directly causing the
other.
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